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Abstract
We propose a new class of signal injection attacks on micro-
phones by physically converting light to sound. We show how
an attacker can inject arbitrary audio signals to a target mi-
crophone by aiming an amplitude-modulated light at the mi-
crophone’s aperture. We then proceed to show how this effect
leads to a remote voice-command injection attack on voice-
controllable systems. Examining various products that use
Amazon’s Alexa, Apple’s Siri, Facebook’s Portal, and Google
Assistant, we show how to use light to obtain control over these
devices at distances up to 110 meters and from two separate
buildings. Next, we show that user authentication on these de-
vices is often lacking, allowing the attacker to use light-injected
voice commands to unlock the target’s smartlock-protected
front doors, open garage doors, shop on e-commerce websites
at the target’s expense, or even unlock and start various ve-
hicles connected to the target’s Google account (e.g., Tesla
and Ford). Finally, we conclude with possible software and
hardware defenses against our attacks.
1 Introduction
The consistent growth in computational power is profoundly
changing the way that humans and computers interact. Mov-
ing away from traditional interfaces like keyboards and mice,
in recent years computers have become sufficiently powerful
to understand and process human speech. Recognizing the
potential of quick and natural human-computer interaction,
technology giants such as Apple, Google, Facebook, and Ama-
zon have each launched their own large-scale deployment of
voice-controllable (VC) systems that continuously listen to and
act on human voice commands.
With tens of millions of devices sold with Alexa, Siri, Portal,
and Google Assistant, users can now interact with services
without the need to sit in front of a computer or type on a
mobile phone. Responding to this trend, the Internet of Things
(IoT) market has also undergone a small revolution. Rather than
having each device be controlled via a dedicated manufacture-
provided software, IoT manufacturers can now spend their time
making hardware, coupling it with a lightweight interface to
integrate their products with Alexa, Siri or Google Assistant.
Thus, users can receive information and control products by the
mere act of speaking without the need for physical interaction
with keyboards, mice, touchscreens, or even buttons.
However, while much attention is being given to improv-
ing the capabilities of VC systems, much less is known about
the resilience of these systems to software and hardware at-
tacks. Indeed, previous works [1, 2] already highlight the lack
of proper user authentication as a major limitation of voice-
only interaction, causing systems to execute commands from
potentially malicious sources.
While early command-injection techniques were noticeable
by the device’s legitimate owner, more recent works [3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10] focus on stealthy injection, preventing users from
hearing or recognizing the injected commands.
The absence of voice authentication has resulted in a
proximity-based threat model, where close-proximity users
are considered legitimate, while attackers are kept at bay by
physical obstructions like walls, locked doors, or closed win-
dows. For attackers aiming to surreptitiously gain control over
physically-inaccessible systems, existing injection techniques
are unfortunately limited, as the current state of the art [6] has
a range of about 25 ft (7.62 m) in open space, with physical
barriers (e.g., windows) further reducing the distance. Thus, in
this paper we tackle the following questions:
Can commands be remotely and stealthily injected into a voice-
controllable system from large distances? If so, how can an
attacker perform such an attack under realistic conditions and
with limited physical access? Finally, what are the implica-
tions of such command injections on third-party IoT hardware
integrated with the voice-controllable system?
1.1 Our Contribution
In this paper we present LightCommands, an attack that can
covertly inject commands into voice-controllable systems at
long distances.
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Figure 1: Experimental setup for exploring attack range. (Top) Floor plan of the 110 m long corridor. (Left) Laser with telephoto
lens mounted on geared tripod head for aiming. (Center) Laser aiming at the target across the 110 m corridor. (Right) Laser spot on
the target device mounted on tripod.
Laser-Based Audio Injection. First, we have identified a
semantic gap between the physics and specifications of micro-
phones, where microphones often unintentionally respond to
light as if it was sound. Exploiting this effect, we can inject
sound into microphones by simply modulating the amplitude
of a laser light.
Attacking Voice-Controllable Systems. Next, we investi-
gate the vulnerability of popular VC systems (such as Alexa,
Siri, Portal, and Google Assistant) to light-based audio injec-
tion attacks. We find that 5 mW of laser power (the equivalent
of a laser pointer) is sufficient to control many popular voice-
activated smart home devices, while about 60 mW is sufficient
for gaining control over phones and tablets.
Attack Range. Using a telephoto lens to focus the laser, we
demonstrate the first command injection attack on VC systems
which achieves distances of up to 110 meters (the maximum
distance safely available to us) as shown in Figure 1. We also
demonstrate how light can be used to control VC systems
across buildings and through closed glass windows at similar
distances. Finally, we note that unlike previous works that have
limited range due to the use of sound for signal injection, the
range obtained by light-based injection is only limited by the
attacker’s power budget, optics, and aiming capabilities.
Insufficient Authentication. Having established the feasi-
bility of malicious control over VC systems at large distances,
we investigate the security implications of such attacks. We
find that VC systems often lack any user authentication mech-
anisms, or if the mechanisms are present, they are incorrectly
implemented (e.g., allowing for PIN brute forcing). We show
how an attacker can use light-injected voice commands to un-
lock the target’s smart-lock protected front door, open garage
doors, shop on e-commerce websites, or even locate, unlock
and start various vehicles (e.g., Tesla and Ford) if the vehicles
are connected to the target’s Google account.
Attack Stealthiness and Cheap Setup. We then show how
an attacker can build a cheap yet effective injection setup,
using commercially available laser pointers and laser drivers.
Moreover, by using infrared lasers and abusing volume features
(e.g., whisper mode for Alexa devices) on the target device, we
show how an attacker can mount a light-based audio injection
attack while minimizing the chance of discovery by the target’s
legitimate owner.
Countermeasures. Finally, we discuss software and
hardware-based countermeasures against our attacks.
Summary of Contributions. In this paper we make the
following contributions.
1. Discover a vulnerability in MEMS microphones, making
them susceptible to light-based signal injection attacks (Sec-
tion 4).
2. Characterize the vulnerability of popular Alexa, Siri, Por-
tal, and Google Assistant devices to light-based command
injection across large distances and varying laser power
(Section 5).
3. Assess the security implications of malicious command
injection attacks on VC systems and demonstrate how such
attacks can be mounted using cheap and readily available
equipment (Section 6).
4. Discuss software and hardware countermeasures to light-
based signal injection attacks (Section 7).
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1.2 Safety and Responsible Disclosure
Laser Safety. Laser radiation requires special controls for
safety, as high-powered lasers might cause hazards of fire, eye
damage, and skin damage. We urge that researchers receive for-
mal laser safety training and approval of experimental designs
before attempting reproduction of our work. In particular, all
the experiments in this paper were conducted under a Standard
Operating Procedure which was approved by our university’s
Safety Committee.
Disclosure Process. Following the practice of responsible
disclosure, we have shared our findings with Google, Amazon,
Apple, Facebook, August, Ford, Tesla, and Analog Devices,
a major supplier of MEMS microphones. We subsequently
maintained contact with the security teams of these vendors, as
well as with ICS-CERT and the FDA. The findings presented
in this paper were made public on the mutually-agreed date of
November 4th, 2019.
2 Background
2.1 Voice-Controllable System
The term “Voice-Controllable (VC) system” refers to a sys-
tem that is controlled primarily by voice commands directly
spoken by users in a natural language, e.g., English. While
some important exceptions exist, VC systems often immedi-
ately operate on voice commands issued by the user without
requiring further interaction. For example, when the user com-
mands the VC system to “open the garage door”, the garage
door is immediately opened.
Following the terminology of [4], a typical VC system
is composed of three main components: (i) voice capture,
(ii) speech recognition, and (iii) command execution. First,
the voice capture subsystem is responsible for converting
sound produced by the user into electrical signals. Next, the
speech recognition subsystem is responsible for detecting the
wake word in the acquired signal (e.g., “Alexa", “OK Google",
"Hey Portal" or “Hey Siri") and subsequently interpreting
the meaning of the voice command using signal and natural-
language processing. Finally, the command-execution subsys-
tem launches the corresponding application or executes an
operation based on the recognized voice command.
2.2 Attacks on Voice-Controllable Systems
Several previous works explored the security of VC systems,
uncovering vulnerabilities that allow attackers to issue unau-
thorized voice commands to these devices [3, 4, 5, 6, 7].
Malicious Command Injection. More specifically, [1, 2] de-
veloped malicious smartphone applications that play synthetic
audio commands into nearby VC systems without requiring
any special operating system permissions. While these attacks
transmit commands that are easily noticeable to a human lis-
tener, other works [3, 8, 9] focused on camouflaging commands
in audible signals, attempting to make them unintelligible or
unnoticeable to human listeners, while still being recognizable
to speech recognition models.
Inaudible Voice Commands. A more recent line of work
focuses on completely hiding the voice commands from hu-
man listeners. Roy et al. [5] demonstrate that high frequency
sounds inaudible to humans can be recorded by commodity
microphones. Subsequently, Song and Mittal [10] and Dol-
phinAttack [4] extended the work of [5] by sending inaudible
commands to VC systems via word modulation on ultrasound
carriers. By exploiting microphone nonlinearities, a signal
modulated onto an ultrasonic carrier is demodulated to the au-
dible range by the targeted microphone, recovering the original
voice command while remaining undetected by humans.
However, both attacks are limited to short distances (from 2
cm to 175 cm) due to the transmitter operating at low power.
Unfortunately, increasing the transmitting power generates an
audible frequency component containing the (hidden) voice
command, as the transmitter is also affected by the same non-
linearity observed in the receiving microphone. Tackling the
distance limitation, Roy et al. [6] mitigated this effect by split-
ting the signal in multiple frequency bins and playing them
through an array of 61 speakers. However, the re-appearance
of audible leakage still limits the attack’s range to 25 ft (7.62
m) in open space, with physical barriers (e.g., windows) and
the absorption of ultrasonic waves in air further reducing range
by attenuating the transmitted signal.
Skill Squatting Attacks. A final line of work focuses on
confusing speech recognition systems, causing them to misin-
terpret correctly-issued voice commands. These so-called skill
squatting attacks [11, 12] work by exploiting systematic errors
in the recognition of similarly sounding words, routing users
to malicious applications without their knowledge.
2.3 Acoustic Signal Injection Attacks
Several works used acoustic signal injection as a method of
inducing unintended behavior in various systems.
More specifically, Son et al. [13] showed that MEMS sensors
are sensitive to ultrasound signals, resulting in denial of ser-
vice attacks against inertial measurement unit (IMU) on drones.
Subsequently, Yan et al. [14] demonstrated that acoustic waves
can be used to saturate and spoof ultrasonic sensors, impairing
car safety. This was further improved by Walnut [15], which
exploited aliasing and clipping effects in the sensor’s compo-
nents to achieve precise control over MEMS accelerometers
via sound injection.
More recently, Nashimoto et al. [16] showed the possibility
of using sound to attack sensor-fusion algorithms that rely on
data from multiple sensors (e.g., accelerometers, gyroscopes,
and magnetometers) while Blue Note [17] demonstrates the
feasibility of sound attacks on mechanical hard drives, resulting
in operating system crashes.
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2.4 Laser Injection Attacks
In addition to sound, light has also been utilized for signal injec-
tion. Indeed, [14, 18, 19] mounted denial of service attacks on
cameras and LiDARs by illuminating victims’ photo-receivers
with strong lights. This was later extended by Shin et al. [20]
and Cao et al. [21] to a more sophisticated attack that injects
precisely-controlled signals to LiDAR systems, causing the
target to see an illusory object. Next, Park et al. [22] showed
an attack on medical infusion pumps, using light to attack opti-
cal sensors that count the number of administered medication
drops. Finally, Uluagac et al. [23] show how various sensors,
such as infrared and light sensors, can be used to activate and
transfer malware between infected devices.
Another line of work focuses on using light for injecting
faults inside computing devices, resulting in security breaches.
More specifically, it is well-known that laser light causes
soft (temporary) errors in semiconductors, where similar er-
rors are also caused by ionizing radiation [24]. Exploiting
this effect, Skorobogatov and Anderson [25] showed the first
light-induced fault attacks on smartcards and microcontrollers,
demonstrating the possibility of flipping individual bits in mem-
ory cells. This effect was subsequently exploited in numerous
follow ups, using laser-induced faults to compromise the hard-
ware’s data and logic flow, extract secret keys, and dump the
device’s memory. See [26, 27] for further details.
2.5 MEMS Microphones
MEMS is an integrated implementation of mechanical compo-
nents on a chip, typically fabricated with an etching process.
While there are a number of different MEMS sensors (e.g.,
accelerometers and gyroscopes), in this paper we focus on
MEMS-based microphones, which are particularly popular in
mobile and embedded applications (such as smartphones and
smart speakers) due to their small footprints and low prices.
Microphone Overview. The left column of Figure 2 shows
the construction of a typical backport MEMS microphone,
which is composed of a diaphragm and an ASIC circuit. The
diaphragm is a thin membrane that flexes in response to an
acoustic wave. The diaphragm and a fixed back plate work
as a parallel-plate capacitor, whose capacitance changes as a
consequence of the diaphragm’s mechanical deformations as
it responds to alternating sound pressures. Finally, the ASIC
die converts the capacitive change to a voltage signal on the
output of the microphone.
Microphone Mounting. A backport MEMS microphone
is mounted on the surface of a printed circuit board (PCB),
with the microphone’s aperture exposed through a cavity on
the PCB (see the third column of Figure 2). The cavity, in turn,
is part of an acoustic path that guides sound through holes
(acoustic ports) in the device’s chassis to the microphone’s
aperture. Finally, the device’s acoustic ports typically have a
fine mesh as shown in Figure 3 to prevent dirt and foreign
objects from entering the microphone.
2.6 Laser Sources
Choice of a Laser. A laser is a device that emits a beam of
coherent light that stays narrow over a long distance and be
focused to a tight spot. While other alternatives exist, in this
paper we focus on laser emitting diodes, which are common
in consumer laser products such as laser pointers. Next, as
the light intensity emitted from a laser diode is directly pro-
portional to the diode’s driving current, we can easily encode
analog signals via the beam’s intensity by using a laser driver
capable of amplitude modulation.
Laser Safety and Availability. As strong, tightly focused
lights can be potentially hazardous, there are standards in place
regulating lights emitted from laser systems [28, 29] that divide
lasers into classes based on the potential for injury resulting
from beam exposure. In this paper, we are interested in two
main types of devices, which we now describe.
Low-Power Class 3R Systems. This class contains de-
vices whose output power is less than 5 mW at visible wave-
length (400–700 nm, see Figure 4). While prolonged inten-
tional eye exposure to the beam emitted from these devices
might be harmful, these lasers are considered safe for brief eye-
exposures. As such, class 3R systems form a good compromise
between safety and usability, making these lasers common in
consumer products such as laser pointers.
High-Power Class 3B and Class 4 Systems. Next, lasers
that emit between 5 and 500 mW are classified as class 3B
systems, and might cause eye injury even from short beam
exposure durations. Finally, lasers that emit over 500 mW of
power are categorized as class 4, which can instantaneously
cause blindness, skin burns and fires. As such, uncontrolled
exposure to class 4 laser beams should be strongly avoided.
However, despite the regulation, there are reports of high-
power class 3B and 4 systems being openly sold as “laser
pointers” [30]. While purchasing laser pointers from Amazon
and eBay, we have discovered a troubling discrepancy between
the rated and actual power of laser products. While the labels
and descriptions of most products stated an output power of 5
mW, the actual measured power was sometimes as high as 1
W (i.e., ×200 above the allowable limit).
3 Threat Model
The attacker’s goal is to remotely inject malicious commands
into the targeted voice-controllable device without being de-
tected by the device’s owner. More specifically, we consider
the following threat model.
No Physical Access or Owner Interaction. We assume that
the attacker does not have any physical access to the victim
device. Thus, the attacker cannot press any buttons, alter voice-
inaccessible settings, or compromise the device’s software.
Finally, we assume that the attacker cannot make the device’s
owner perform any useful interaction (such as pressing a button
or unlocking the screen).
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Line of Sight. We do assume however that the attacker
has remote line of sight access to the target device and its
microphones. We argue that such an assumption is reasonable,
as voice-activated devices (such as smart speakers, thermostats,
security cameras, or even phones) are often left visible to the
attacker, including through closed glass windows.
Device Feedback. We note that the remote line of sight
access to the target device usually allows the attacker to observe
the device’s LED lights. Generally, these LEDs light up after a
device properly recognizes its wake-up word (e.g., Alexa, Hey
Google) and show unique colors and light patterns once a voice
command has been recognized and accepted. Observing the
lights, an attacker can use this feedback to remotely determine
if an attack attempt was successful.
Device Characteristics. Finally, we also assume that the
attacker has access to a device of a similar model as the tar-
get device. Thus, the attacker knows all the target’s physical
characteristics, such as location of the microphone ports and
physical structure of the device’s sound path. Such knowledge
can easily be acquired by purchasing and analyzing a device of
the same model before launching attacks. We do not, however,
assume that the attacker has prior access the specific device
instance used by the victim. In particular, all the experiments
done in this paper were empirically verified to be applicable
to other devices of the same model available to us without
instance-specific calibration.
4 Injecting Sound via Laser Light
4.1 Signal Injection Feasibility
In this section we explore the feasibility of injecting acous-
tic signals into microphones using laser light. We begin by
describing our experimental setup.
Setup. We used a blue Osram PLT5 450B 450-nm laser
diode connected to a Thorlabs LDC205C laser driver. We in-
creased the diode’s DC current with the driver until it emitted
a continuous 5 mW laser beam, while measuring light inten-
sity using the Thorlabs S121C photo-diode power sensor. The
beam was subsequently directed to the acoustic port on the
SparkFun MEMS microphone breakout board mounting the
Analog Devices ADMP401 MEMS microphone. Finally, we
recorded the diode current and the microphone’s output using
a Tektronix MSO5204 oscilloscope, see Figure 5. The exper-
iments were conducted in a regular office environment, with
typical ambient noise from human speech, computers, and air
conditioning systems.
Signal Injection by Converting Sound to Light. To con-
vert sound signals into light, we encode the intensity of the
sound signal as the intensity of the laser beam, where louder
sounds make for larger changes in light intensity and weaker
sounds correspond to smaller changes. Next, as the intensity
of the light beam emitted from the laser diode is direction pro-
portional with the supplied current, we use a laser driver to
regulate the laser diode’s current as a function of an audio file
played into the driver’s input port. This resulted in the audio
waveform being directly encoded in the intensity of the light
emitted by the laser.
More specifically, we used the current driver to modulate
a sine wave on top of the diode’s current It via amplitude
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Figure 5: Testing signal injection feasibility. (Left) A setup for signal injection feasibility composed of a laser current driver, PC,
audio amplifier, and oscilloscope. (Middle) Laser diode with beam aimed at a MEMS microphone breakout board. (Right) Diode
current and microphone output waveforms.
modulation (AM), given by the following equation:
It = IDC+
Ipp
2
sin(2pi f t) (1)
where IDC is a DC bias, Ipp is the peak-to-peak amplitude,
and f is the frequency. In this section, we set IDC = 26.2 mA,
Ipp = 7 mA and f = 1 kHz. The sine wave was played using
a laptop’s on-board soundcard, where the speaker output was
connected to the modulation input port on the laser driver
via a Neoteck NTK059 audio amplifier. The laser driver [31]
performs an amplitude modulation (AM) of the sine wave onto
its output current without needing additional custom circuits
or software. Finally, as the light intensity emitted by the laser
diode is directly proportional to the current provided by the
laser driver, this resulted in a 1 kHz sine wave directly encoded
in the intensity of the light emitted by the laser diode.
Observing the Microphone Output. As can be seen in
Figure 5, the microphone output clearly shows a 1 kHz sine
wave that matches the frequency of the injected signal without
any noticeable distortion.
4.2 Characterizing Laser Audio Injection
Having successfully demonstrated the possibility of injecting
audio signals via laser beams, we now proceed to character-
ize the light intensity response of the diodes (as a function
of current) and the frequency response of the microphone to
laser-based audio injection. To see the wavelength dependency,
we also examine a 638-nm red laser (Ushio HL63603TG) in
addition to the blue one used in the previous experiment.
Laser Current to Light Characteristics. We begin by ex-
amining the relationship between the diode current and the
optical power of the laser. For this purpose, we aimed a laser
beam at our Thorlabs S121C power sensor while driving the
diodes with DC currents, i.e., Ipp = 0 in Equation 1. Consider-
ing the different properties of the diodes, the blue and red laser
are examined up to 300 and 200 mA, respectively.
The first column of Figure 6 shows the current vs. light (I-L)
curves for the blue and red lasers. The horizontal axis is the
diode current IDC and the vertical axis is the optical power. As
can be seen, once the current provided to the laser is above
the diode-specific threshold (denoted by Ith), the light power
emitted by the laser increases linearly with the provided current.
Thus, as |sin(2pi f t)| < 1, we have an (approximately) linear
conversion of current to light provided that IDC− Ipp/2> Ith.
Laser Current to Sound Characteristics. We now proceed
to characterize the effect of light injection on a MEMS micro-
phone. We achieve this by aiming an amplitude-modulated
(AM) laser beam with variable current amplitudes (Ipp) and
a constant current offset (IDC) into the aperture of the Ana-
log Devices ADMP401 microphone, mounted on a breakout
board. We subsequently monitor the peak-to-peak voltage of
the microphone’s output, plotting the resulting signal.
The second column of Figure 6 shows the relationship be-
tween the modulating signal Ipp and the resulting signal Vpp
for both the blue and red laser diodes. The results suggest that
the driving alternating current Ipp (cf. the bias current) is the
key for strong injection: we can linearly increase the sound
volume received by the microphone by increasing the driving
AC current Ipp.
Choosing IDC and Ipp. Given a laser diode that can emit a
maximum average power of L mW, we would like to choose
the values for IDC and Ipp which result in the strongest possible
microphone output signals, while having the average optical
power emitted by the laser be less than or equal to L mW. From
the leftmost column of Figure 6, we deduce that the laser’s
output power is linearly proportional to the laser’s driving cur-
rent It = IDC+ Ipp sin(2pi f t), and the average power depends
mostly on IDC, as Ipp sin(2pi f t) averages out to zero.
Thus, to stay within the power budget of L mW while ob-
taining the strongest possible signal at the microphone output,
the attacker must first determine the DC current offset IDC that
results in the diode outputting light at L mW, and then subse-
quently maximize the amplitude of the microphone’s output
signal by setting Ipp/2 = IDC− Ith.*
*We note here that the subtraction of Ith is designed to ensure that IDC−
Ipp/2> Ith, meaning that the diode stays in its linear region thereby avoiding
signal distortion.
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Figure 6: Characteristics of the 450-nm blue laser (first row) and the 638-nm red laser (second row). (First column) Current-light
DC characteristics. (Second column) Microphone response for a 1 kHz tone with different amplitudes. (Third column) Frequency
responses of the overall setup for fixed bias and amplitude.
Characterizing the Frequency Response of Laser Audio
Injection. Next, we set out to characterize the response of
the microphone to different frequencies of laser-injected sound
signals. We use the same operating points as the previous
experiment, and set the tone’s amplitude such that it fits with
the linear region (IDC = 200 mA and Ipp = 150 mA for the
blue laser, and IDC = 150 mA and Ipp = 75 mA for the red
laser). We then record the microphone’s output levels while
changing the frequency f of the light-modulated sine wave.
The third column of Figure 6 shows the obtained frequency
response for both blue and red lasers. The horizontal axis is the
frequency while the vertical axis is the peak-to-peak voltage of
the microphone output. Both lasers have very similar responses,
covering the entire audible band 20 Hz–20 kHz, implying the
possibility of injecting any audio signal.
Choice of Laser. Finally, we note the color insensitivity
of injection. Although blue and red lights are on the other
edges on the visible spectrum (see Figure 4), the levels of in-
jected audio signal are in the same range and the shapes of the
frequency-response curves are also similar. Therefore, color
has low priority in choosing a laser compared to other factors
for making LightCommands. In this paper, we consistently use
the 450-nm blue laser mainly because of (i) better availabil-
ity of high-power diodes and (ii) the advantage in focusing
because of a shorter wavelength.
4.3 Mechanical or Electrical Transduction?
In this section we set out to investigate the physical root cause
behind of the microphone’s sensitivity to light. We consider
both the photoelectric and photoacoustic effects, and try to
distinguish between them by selectively illuminating different
parts of the microphone’s internal structure using lasers.
Photoelectric Effect. Traditional laser fault injection attacks
on semiconductor chips (as described in 2.4) are explained
by the photoelectric effect in transistors [26, 27] resulting in
irregularities in the device’s digital logic. Likewise, MEMS
microphones also have ASICs inside their packages, which are
used for converting the capacitive changes of the diaphragm
into an electrical signal (see Figure 2). Such ASICs can be
externally-illuminated via lasers through the microphone’s ex-
posed acoustic port. As strong light hits a semiconductor chip,
it induces a photocurrent across a transistor, where the current’s
strength is proportional to the light intensity [24]. The analog
part of the microphone’s ASIC recognizes this photocurrent
as a genuine signal from the diaphragm, resulting in the mi-
crophone treating light as sound. Confirming this, while not
common in smart speakers, we have seen several other micro-
phone vendors covering the ASIC with opaque resin, known
in the industry as “goop”.
Photoacoustic Effect. The light sensitivity of microphones
can also be attributed to the photoacoustic effect [32], which
converts optical to kinetic energy and induces mechanical vi-
bration at the illuminated material. The effect is well known for
more than 100 years since its discovery by Alexander Graham
Bell back in 1880 [33], which is now used for spectroscopy and
bioimaging. Although we have not found any previous work
on the photoacoustic effect specific to a MEMS microphone,
the effect is universal and available even with ambient water
vapor in the air [34].
Selective Laser Illumination. We can further narrow the
root cause of the microphone’s light sensitivity, by noticing
that the photoelectric effect happens on an ASIC while the
photoacoustic effect on a diaphragm. Thus, by selectively illu-
minating different microphone components using a laser, we
attempted to precisely show the physical root cause.
We achieve this by opening the metal package of the Analog
Devices ADMP401 microphone and injecting analog signals
into its diaphragm and ASIC components using a focused
laser beam (see Figure 2). After using a microscope to fo-
cus a 200 µm laser spot on the microphone’s components, we
observed the strongest signal while aiming the laser on the
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ASIC covered by black epoxy
ASICLaser spot
Figure 7: (Left) Laser spot on the ADMP401’s ASIC. (Right)
the ASIC covered with opaque epoxy to block laser light.
microphone’s ASIC, as shown in Figure 7(left). This direct
injection is very efficient, where less than 0.1 mW of laser
power was sufficient to saturate the microphone. We take this
as an indication that laser light can cause photoelectric trans-
duction inside the microphone’s ASIC, since in our attack the
light is reflected onto the ASIC from the microphone’s metal
package. After covering the microphone’s ASIC with opaque
epoxy (Figure 7(right)), aiming the laser on the ASIC no longer
generates any signal. However, even after the treatment, the
microphone still generates a signal when the laser spot is aimed
at the microphone’s diaphragm.
Based on these results, we conclude that in addition to the
photoelectric effect observed on the microphone’s ASIC, there
is another light-induced transduction within the MEMS di-
aphragm. Since the diaphragm is a simple capacitor, we hy-
pothesize that this effect is due to the physical movements of
the microphone’s diaphragm (i.e., light-induced mechanical
vibration).
Next, while the above is not a comprehensive survey on
different MEMS microphones, this analysis does provide an
overall understanding of the root cause of the physicals effects
observed in this paper. Finally, for the experiments conducted
in the remainder of this paper, we have aimed the laser through
the microphone’s acoustic port. We hypothesize that our at-
tacks illuminated both the microphone’s ASIC and diaphragm,
resulting in some combination of the photoacoustic and photo-
electric effects.
5 Attacking Voice-Controllable Systems
In this section we evaluate our attack on seventeen popular VC
systems. We aim to find out the minimum laser power required
by the attacker to gain control over the VC system under ideal
conditions as well as the maximum distance that such control
can be obtained under more realistic conditions.
Target Selection. We benchmark our attack against several
consumer devices which have voice control capabilities (see
Table 1). We aim to test the most popular voice assistants –
namely Alexa, Siri, Portal, and Google Assistant. While we do
not claim that our list is exhaustive, we do argue that it does
provide some intuition about the vulnerability of popular VC
systems to laser-based voice injection attacks. Next, to explore
how different hardware variations (rather than algorithmic vari-
ations) affect our attack performance, we benchmark our attack
on multiple devices running the same voice recognition back-
end: Alexa, Siri, Portal and Google Assistant, as summarized
in Table 1. For some devices, we examine different generations
to explore the differences on attack performance for various
hardware models. Finally, we also considered third-party de-
vices with built-in speech recognition, such as the EcoBee
thermostat.
5.1 Exploring Laser Power Requirements
In this section we aim to characterize the minimum laser power
required by the attacker under ideal conditions to control a
voice-activated system. Before describing our experimental
setup, we discuss our selection of voice commands and experi-
ment success criteria.
Command Selection. We have selected four different voice
commands that represent common operations performed by
voice-controllable systems.
• What Time Is It? We use this command as a baseline of
our experiments, as it only requires the device to correctly
recognize the command and access the Internet to recover
the current time.
• Set the Volume to Zero. Here, we demonstrate the at-
tacker’s ability to control the output of a VC system. We
expect this to be the first voice command issued by the at-
tacker, in an attempt to avoid attracting attention from the
target’s legitimate owner.
• Purchase a Laser Pointer. With this command we show
how an attacker can potentially place order for various prod-
ucts on behalf (and at the expense) of users. The attacker can
subsequently wait for delivery near the target’s residents and
collect the purchased item.
• Open the Garage Door. Finally, we show how an attacker
can interact with additional systems which have been linked
by the user to the targeted VC system. While the garage door
opener is one such example with clear security implications,
we discuss other examples in Section 6.
Command Generation. We have generated audio recordings
of all four of the above commands using a common audio
recording system (e.g., Audacity). Each command recording
was subsequently appended to a recording of the wake word
corresponding to the device being tested (e.g., Alexa, Hey
Siri, Hey Portal, or OK, Google) and normalized to adjust
the overall volume of the recordings to a constant value. We
obtained a resulting corpus of 16 complete commands. Next,
for each device, we injected four of the complete commands
(those beginning with the device-appropriate wake word) into
the device’s microphone using the setup described below and
observed the device’s response. Finally, we note that no device-
specific calibration was done during the generation of the audio
files containing the voice commands.
Verifying Successful Injection. We consider a command
injection successful in case the device indicates the correct
interpretation of the command. We note that some commands
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require other devices to be attached to the victim account in
order to properly execute, resulting in an error otherwise (e.g.,
a garage door opener for a command opening the garage door).
As in this section we only test feasibility of command injection
(as opposed to end-to-end attacks of Section 6), we consider
an injection attempt successful in case the device properly rec-
ognized all the command’s words. For devices with screens
(e.g., phones and screen-enabled speakers), we verified that the
device displayed a correct transcription of the light-injected
command. Finally, for screen-less devices (e.g., smart speak-
ers), we examined the command log of the account associated
with the device for the command transcription.
Attack Success Criteria. For a given power budget, distance,
and command, we consider the injection successful when the
device correctly recognized the command during three con-
secutive attempts. The injection attempt is considered to be a
failure otherwise (e.g., the device only recognizes the wake-up
word but not the entire command). We take this as an indication
that the power budget is sufficient for achieving a near-perfect
consecutive command recognition assuming suitable aiming
and focusing.
Next, we consider an attack successful, for a given power
budget and distance, when all four commands are successfully
injected to the device in three consecutive injection attempts.
The attack is considered a failure in any other case (e.g., achiev-
ing two out of three correct command recognitions). Like in
the individual command case, we take this as an indication
that the considered power budget and distance is sufficient
for a successful command injection. As such, the results in
this section should be seen as a conservative estimate of what
an attacker can achieve for each device assuming good en-
vironmental conditions (e.g., quiet surroundings and suitable
aiming).
Voice Customization and Security Settings. For the ex-
periments conducted in this section, we left all the device’s
settings in their default configuration. In embedded Alexa and
Google VC systems (e.g., smart speakers, cameras, etc.) voice
customization is off by default, meaning that the device will
operate on commands spoken by any voice. Meanwhile, for
phones and tablets, we left the voice identification in its default
activated setting. For such devices, to ascertain the minimum
required power for a successful attack, we personalized the
device’s voice recognition system with the human voice used
to generate the command recordings described above. We then
subsequently inject the audio recording of the commands us-
ing the same voice without any other customization. Finally,
in Section 5.4, we discuss bypassing various voice matching
mechanisms.
Experimental Setup. We use the same blue laser and Thor-
labs laser driver as in Section 4.1, aiming the laser beam at mi-
crophone ports of the devices listed in Table 1 from a distance
of about 30 cm. Next, to control the surrounding environment,
the entire setup was placed in a metal enclosure, with opaque
bottom and sides and with a dark red semi-transparent acrylic
Figure 8: Exploring minimum laser power requirements: the
laser and target are arranged inside an enclosure. The laser spot
is aimed at the target acoustic port using electrically control-
lable scanning mirrors inside the enclosure. The enclosure’s
top red acrylic cover was removed for visual clarity.
Figure 9: Google Home Mini. Notice the cloth-covered micro-
phone ports.
top plate, designed to block blue light. See Figure 8. As the
goal of the experiments described in this section is to ascertain
the minimum required power for a successful attack on each
device, we have used a pair of electrically controlled scanning
mirrors (40 Kbps high-speed laser scanning system for laser
shows) to precisely place the laser beam in the center of the
device’s microphone port. Before each experiment we man-
ually focused the laser so that the laser spot size hitting the
microphone is minimal.
For aiming at devices whose microphone port is covered
with cloth (e.g., Google Home Mini shown in Figure 9), the
position of the microphone ports can be determined using an
easily-observable reference point such as the device’s wire con-
nector or LED array. Finally, we note that the distance between
the microphone and the reference point is easily obtainable by
the attacker either by exploring his own device, or by referring
to online teardown videos [35].
Experimental Results. The fifth column of Table 1 presents
a summary of our results. While the power required from the at-
tacker varies from 0.5 mW (Google Home) to 60 mW (Galaxy
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Table 1: Tested devices with minimum activation power and maximum distance achievable at the given power of 5 mW and 60
mW. A 110 m long hallway was used for 5 mW tests while a 50 m long hallway was used for tests at 60 mW.
Device Backend Category Authen- Minimum Max Distance Max Distancetication Power [mW]* at 60 mW [m]** at 5 mW [m]***
Google Home Google Assistant Speaker No 0.5 50+ 110+
Google Home Mini Google Assistant Speaker No 16 20 —
Google Nest Cam IQ Google Assistant Camera No 9 50+ —
Echo Plus 1st Generation Alexa Speaker No 2.4 50+ 110+
Echo Plus 2nd Generation Alexa Speaker No 2.9 50+ 50
Echo Alexa Speaker No 25 50+ —
Echo Dot 2nd Generation Alexa Speaker No 7 50+ —
Echo Dot 3rd Generation Alexa Speaker No 9 50+ —
Echo Show 5 Alexa Speaker No 17 50+ —
Echo Spot Alexa Speaker No 29 50+ —
Facebook Portal Mini (Front Mic) Alexa Speaker No 1 50+ 40
Facebook Portal Mini (Front Mic)§ Portal Speaker No 6 40 —
Fire Cube TV Alexa Streamer No 13 20 —
EcoBee 4 Alexa Thermostat No 1.7 50+ 70
iPhone XR (Front Mic) Siri Phone Yes 21 10 —
iPad 6th Gen Siri Tablet Yes 27 20 —
Samsung Galaxy S9 (Bottom Mic) Google Assistant Phone Yes 60 5 —
Google Pixel 2 (Bottom Mic) Google Assistant Phone Yes 46 5 —
*at 30 cm distance, **Data limited to a 50 m long corridor, ***Data limited to a 110 m long corridor, §Data generated using only the first 3 commands.
S9), all the devices are susceptible to laser-based command in-
jection, even when the device’s microphone port (e.g., Google
Home Mini) is covered with fabric and / or foam.
Finally, for Facebook’s Portal Mini device which supports
both Amazon’s and Facebook’s voice assistants, we note the
×6 increase in minimum power between “Hey Portal" and
“Alexa" wakeup words. In addition, Portal also consistently
failed to identify the word “laser” used in the last command,
forcing us to disregard it. As both experiments were done using
the same setup and with the laser aimed at the same micro-
phone, we attribute these to algorithmic differences between
Amazon’s and Facebook’s voice recognition backends.
5.2 Exploring Attack Range
The experiments done in Section 5.1 are performed under ideal
conditions, at close range and with the aid of electronic aiming
mirrors. Thus, in this section we report on attack results under
more realistic distance and aiming conditions.
Experimental Setup. From the experiments performed in
Section 5.1 we note that about 60 mW of laser power is suffi-
cient for successfully attacking all of our tested devices (at least
under ideal conditions). Thus, in this section we benchmark
the range of our attack using two power budgets.
• 60 mW High-Power Laser. As explained in Section 2.6,
we frequently encountered laser pointers whose measured
power output was above 60 mW, which greatly exceeds legal
5 mW restrictions. Thus, emulating an attacker which does
not follow laser safety protocols for consumer devices, we
benchmark our attack using a 60 mW laser, which is suffi-
cient for successfully attacking all of our tested devices in
the previous experiment.
• 5 mW Low-Power Laser. Next, we also explore the max-
imum range of a more restricted attacker, which is limited
to the maximum amount of power allowed in the U.S. for
consumer laser pointers, namely 5 mW.
Laser Focusing and Aiming. For large attack distances (tens
of meters), laser focusing requires a large diameter lens and
cannot be done via the small lenses that are typically used for
laser pointers. Thus, we mounted our laser to an Opteka 650-
1300 mm high-definition telephoto lens, with 86 mm diameter
(Figure 1(left)). Finally, to simulate realistic aiming conditions
for the attacker, we avoided the use of electronic scanning mir-
rors (used in Section 5.1) and mounted the lens and laser on
a geared camera head (Manfrotto 410 Junior Geared Tripod
Head) and tripod. Laser aiming and focusing was done man-
ually, with the target also mounted on a separate tripod. See
Figure 1 for a picture of our setup.
Test Locations and Experimental Procedure. As eye expo-
sure to a 60 mW laser is potentially dangerous, we blocked off
a 50 meter long corridor in our office building and performed
the experiments at night. However, due to safety reasons, we
were unable to obtain a longer corridor for our high-power
tests. For lower-power attacks, we performed the experiments
in a 110 meter long corridor connecting two buildings (see
Figure 1(top)). In both cases, we fixed the target at increasing
distances and adjusted the optics accordingly to obtain the
smallest possible laser spot. We regulated the diode current so
that the target is illuminated with 5 or 60 mW respectively. Fi-
nally, the corridor is illuminated with regular fluorescent lamps
at office-level brightness while the ambient acoustic noise was
about 46 dB (measured using a General Tools DSM403SD
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sound level meter).
Success Criteria. We use the same success criteria as in Sec-
tion 5.1, considering the attack successful at a given distance
in case the device correctly recognized all commands during
three consecutive injection attempts and considering failure
otherwise. We take this as an indication of the maximum range
achievable by the attack at the considered power budget. Fi-
nally, we benchmark our attack’s accuracy as a function of
distance in Section 5.3.
Experimental Results. Table 1 contains a summary of our
distance-benchmarking results. With 60 mW laser power, we
have successfully injected voice commands to all the tested
devices from a distance of several meters. For devices that can
be attacked using 5 mW, we also conducted the low-power
experiment in the 110 m hallway. Untested devices are marked
by ’—’ in Table 1 due of their high minimum activation power.
While most devices require a 60 mW laser for success-
ful command injection (e.g., a non-standard-compliant laser
pointer), some popular smart speakers such as Google Home
and Eco Plus 1st and 2nd Generation are particularly sensitive,
allowing for command injection even with 5 mW power over
tens of meters. Next, as our attacks were conducted in 50 and
110 meter hallways (for 60 and 5 mW lasers, respectively) for
some devices, we had to stop the attack when the maximum
hallway length was reached. We mark this case with a ‘+’ sign
near the device’s range in the appropriate column.
Attack Transferability. Despite inevitable manufacturing
variability between the 17 devices tested in this work, we did
not observe any significant changes between the response of
different microphones to laser injection. That is, all micro-
phones had shown the same high-level behavior, reacting to
light as if it was sound without any microphone-specific cal-
ibration. This evidence also supports the universality of our
attack, as once the laser was aimed and focused, all devices re-
sponded to injected commands without the need for per-device
calibration. Finally, we note that all devices tested in this paper
have multiple microphones, while we aimed our laser to only
a single microphone port. However, despite this, the attack is
still successful indicating that, at the time of writing, VC sys-
tems do not require the microphones’ signals to match before
executing voice commands.
5.3 Exploring Attack’s Success Probability
In the attacks presented in Sections 5.1, 5.2, and Table 1, all
the tested devices properly recognized the injected commands
once suitable aiming and focusing were achieved. However,
as can be seen in Table 1, some devices stopped recognizing
the commands after exceeding a certain distance. Investigating
this phenomenon, we explored the attack’s error rate at the
borderline attack range. To achieve this, we use a Google Home
Mini device as a case study, as its attack range is limited to 20
meters which is shorter than the 50 meter corridor available to
us for high-power 60 mW experiments.
Table 2: Attack success accuracy as a function of distance.
Command 20m 25m 27m
What Time Is It? 100% 90% 0%
Set the Volume to Zero 100% 80% 0%
Purchase a Laser Pointer 90% 0% 0%
Open the Garage Door 100% 100% 0%
Table 2 presents a summary of our findings, where each
command was injected into the Google Home Mini device 10
times (totaling 40 consecutive command injections). As can
be seen, at 20 meters injection attacks are nearly always suc-
cessful, with a single error in recognizing the word “laser”
in the third command. However, at 25 meters the success
probability significantly falls, with no successful injections
observed at 27 meters. These results indicate that while some
commands are a slightly harder to inject than others, the sud-
den drop in performance at 27m indicates that our attack’s
success probability does not seem to be dominated by the com-
mand’s phonemes. Instead, it appears that success probability
is governed by command-unrelated factors such as the inter-
nal microphone structure, the presence of fabric covering the
microphone ports, the power density of the light hitting the
device’s microphone ports, the laser beam focus, alignment,
environmental noise level, machine learning algorithms, etc.
We leave the task of investigating these factors to future work.
5.4 Attacking Speaker Authentication
We begin by distinguishing between speaker recognition fea-
tures, which are designed to recognize voice of specific users
and personalize the device’s content, and speaker authentica-
tion features which is designed to restrict access control to
specific users. While not the main topic of this work, in this
section we now discuss both features in the context of light-
based command injection.
No Speaker Authentication for Smart Speakers. We ob-
serve that for smart-speaker devices (which are the main focus
of this work), speaker recognition is disabled by default at the
time of writing. Next, even if the feature is enabled by careful
users, smart speakers are designed to be used by multiple users.
Thus, their speaker recognition features are usually limited to
content personalization rather than authentication, treating un-
known voices as guests. Empirically verifying this, we found
that Google Home and Alexa smart speakers block voice pur-
chasing for unrecognized voices (presumably as they do not
know which account should be billed for the purchase) while
allowing previously-unheard voices to execute security critical
voice commands such as unlocking doors. Finally, we note
that at the time of writing, voice authentication (as opposed to
personalization) is not available for smart speakers, which are
common home smart assistant deployments.
Phone and Tablet Devices. Next, while not the main focus of
this work, we also investigated the feasibility of light command
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injection into phones and tablets. For such devices, speaker
authentication is enabled by default due to the high processing
power and single owner use.
Overview of Voice Authentication. After being person-
alized with samples of the owner’s voice speaking specific
sentences, the tablet or phone continuously listens to the mi-
crophone and acquires a set of voice samples. The collected
audio is then used by the device’s proprietary voice recogni-
tion systems, aiming to recognize the device’s owner speak-
ing assistant-specific wake up words (e.g., “Hey Siri” or “OK
Google”). Finally, when there is a successful match with the
owner’s voice, the phone or tablet device proceeds to execute
the voice command.
Bypassing Voice Authentication. Intuitively, an attacker
can defeat the speaker authentication feature using authentic
voice recordings of the device’s legitimate owner speaking the
desired voice commands. Alternatively, if no such recordings
are available, DolphinAttack [4] suggests using speech synthe-
sis techniques, such as splicing relevant phonemes from other
recordings of the owner’s voice, to construct the commands.
Wake-Only Security. However, during our experiments we
found that speaker recognition is used by Google and Apple to
only verify the wake word, as opposed to the entire command.
For example, Android and iOS phones trained to recognize
a female voice, correctly execute commands where only the
wake word was spoken by the female voice, while the rest of
the command was spoken using a male voice. Thus, to bypass
voice authentication, an attacker only needs a recording of
the device’s wake word in the owner’s voice (which can be
obtained by recording any command spoken by the owner).
Reproducing Wake Words. Finally, we explore the possibil-
ity of using Text-To-Speech (TTS) techniques for reproducing
the owner’s voice saying the wake words for a tablet or phone
based voice assistant. To that aim, we repeat the phone and
tablet experiments done in Sections 5.1, 5.2 and Table 1, train-
ing all the phone and tablet devices with a human female voice.
We then used NaturalReader [36], an online TTS tool for gener-
ating the wake words specific for each device, hoping that the
features of one of the offered voices will mistakenly match the
human voice used for personalization. See Table 3 for device-
specific voice configurations, as provided by NaturalReader,
which mistakenly match the female voice used for training.
Next, we concatenate the synthetically-generated wake word
spoken in a female voice to a voice command pronounced
by a male native-English speaker. Using these recordings, we
successfully replicated the minimum power and maximum
distance results as presented in Table 1.
We thus conclude that while voice recognition is able to
enforce some similarity between the attacker’s and owner’s
voices, it does not offer sufficient entropy to form an adequate
countermeasure to command injection attacks. In particular,
out of the 18 English voices supported by NaturalReader, we
were able to find an artificial voice matching the human female
voice used for personalization for all four of our tablets and
Table 3: Bypassing voice authentication on phones and tablets
Device Assistant TTS Service Voice Name
iPhone XR Siri NaturalReader US English Heather
iPad 6th Gen Siri NaturalReader US English Laura
Galaxy S9 Google Assistant NaturalReader US English Laura
Pixel 2 Google Assistant NaturalReader US English Laura
phones without using any additional customization. Finally,
we did not test the ability to match voices for devices other
than phones and tablets, as voice authentication is not available
for smart speakers at the time of writing.
6 Exploring Various Attack Scenarios
The results of Section 5 clearly demonstrate the feasibility of
laser-based injection of voice commands into voice-controlled
devices across large attack distances. In this section, we ex-
plore the security implications of such an injection, as well as
experiment with more realistic attack conditions.
6.1 A Low-Power Cross-Building Attack
For the long-range attacks presented in Section 5.2, we delib-
erately placed the target device so that the microphone ports
are facing directly into the laser beam. While this is realistic
for some devices (who have microphone ports on their sides),
such an arrangement is artificial for devices with top-facing
microphones (unless mounted sideways on the wall).
In this section we perform the attack under a more real-
istic conditions, where an attacker aims from another higher
building at a target device placed upright on a window sill.
Experimental Conditions. We use the laser diode, telephoto
lens and laser driver from Section 5, operating the diode at
5 mW (equivalent to a laser pointer) with the same modulation
parameters as in the previous section. Next, we placed a Google
Home device (which only has top-facing microphones) upright
near a window, on a fourth-floor office (15 meters above the
ground). The attacker’s laser was placed on a platform inside
a nearby bell tower, located 43 meters above ground level.
Overall, the distance between the attacker’s and laser was 75
meters, see Figure 10 for the configuration.
Laser Focusing and Aiming. As in Section 5.2, it is impos-
sible to focus the laser using the small lens typically used for
laser pointers. We thus mounted the laser to an Opteka 650-
1300 mm telephoto lens. Next, to aim the laser across large
distances, we have mounted the telephoto lens on a Manfrotto
410 geared tripod head. This allows us to precisely aim the
laser beam on the target device across large distances, achiev-
ing an accuracy far exceeding the one possible with regular
(non-geared) tripod heads where the attacker’s arm directly
moves the laser module. Finally, in order to see the laser spot
and the device’s microphone ports from far away, we have
used a consumer-grade Meade Infinity 102 telescope. As can
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Figure 10: Setup for the low-power cross-building attack: (Top left) Laser and target arrangement. (Bottom left) Picture of the
target device as visible through the telescope, with the microphone ports and laser spot clearly visible. (Middle) Picture from the
tower: laser on telephoto lens aiming down to the target. (Right) Picture from the office building: laser spot on the target device.
be seen in Figure 10 (left), the Google Home microphone’s
ports are clearly visible through the telescope.†
Attack Results. We have successfully injected commands
into the Google Home target in the above described conditions.
We note that despite its low 5 mW power and windy conditions
(which caused some beam wobbling due to laser movement),
the laser beam successfully injected the voice command while
penetrating a closed double-pane glass window. While caus-
ing negligible reflections, the double-pane window did not
cause any visible distortion in the injected signal, with the
laser beam hitting the target’s top microphones at an angle of
21.8 degrees and successfully injecting the command without
the need for any device- or window-specific calibration. We
thus conclude that cross-building laser command injection is
possible, at large distances and under realistic attack condi-
tions. Finally, the experiment in Figure 10 was conducted at
night due to safety requirements, with long-range attacks under
illuminated conditions shown in Section 5.2.
†Figure 10 (left) was taken via a cell phone camera attached to the tele-
scope’s eyepiece. Unfortunately, due to imperfect phone-eyepiece alignment,
the outcome is slightly out of focus and the laser spot is over saturated. How-
ever, the Google Home was in sharp focus with a small laser spot when viewed
directly by a human observer.
6.2 Attacking Authentication
Some of the current generation of VC systems attempt to pro-
tect unauthorized execution of sensitive commands by requir-
ing additional user authentication step. For phone and tablet
devices, the Siri and Alexa apps require the user to unlock
the phone before executing certain commands (e.g., unlock
front door, disable home alarm system). However, for devices
that do not have other form of inputs beside the user’s voice
(e.g., voice-enabled smart speakers, cameras, and thermostats)
a digit-based PIN code is used to authenticate the user before
critical commands are performed.
PIN Eavesdropping. The PIN number spoken by the user
is inherently vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks, which can
be performed remotely using a laser microphone (measuring
the acoustic vibration of a glass window using a laser reflec-
tion [37]), or using common audio eavesdropping techniques.
Moreover, within an application the same PIN is used to au-
thenticate more than one critical command (e.g., “unlock the
car” and “start the engine”) while users often re-use PIN num-
bers across different applications. In both cases, increasing the
number of PIN-protected commands ironically increases the
opportunity for PIN eavesdropping attacks.
PIN Brute forcing. We also observed incorrect implemen-
tation of PIN verification mechanisms. While Alexa naturally
supports PIN authentication (limiting the user to three wrong
attempts before requiring interaction with a phone application),
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Google Assistant delegates PIN authentication to third-party
device vendors that often lack security experience.
Evaluating this design choice, we have investigated the fea-
sibility of PIN brute forcing attacks on an August Smart Lock
Pro, which is the most reviewed smart lock on Amazon at the
time of writing. First, we have discovered that August does
not enforce a reasonable PIN code length, allowing PINs con-
taining anywhere from 1 to 6 digits for door unlocking. Next,
we observed that August does not limit the number of wrong
attempts permitted by the user at the time of writing, nor does
the lock implement a time delay mechanism between incorrect
attempts, allowing the attacker o to unlock the target’s door is
to simply enumerating all possible PIN codes.
Empirically verifying this, we have written a program that
enumerates all 4-digit PIN numbers using a synthetic voice.
After each unsuccessful attempt, the Google home device re-
sponded with “Sorry, the security code is incorrect, can I have
your security code to unlock the front door?” only to have our
program speak the next PIN candidate. Overall, a single unlock
attempt lasted about 13 seconds, requiring 36 hours to enumer-
ate the entire 4-digit space (3.6 hours for 3 digits). In both the
3- and 4-digit case, the door was successfully unlocked when
the correct PIN was reached.
PIN Bypassing. Finally, we discovered that while commands
like “unlock front door” for August locks or “disable alarm
system” for Ring alarms require PIN numbers, other commands
such as “open the garage door” using an assistant-enabled
garage door opener‡ often do not require any authentication.
Thus, even if one command is unavailable, the attacker can
often achieve similar goals by using other commands.
6.3 Attacking Cars
Many modern cars have Internet-over-cellular connectivity,
allowing their owners to perform certain operations via a ded-
icated app on their mobile devices. In some cases, this con-
nectivity has further evolved (either by the vendor or by a
third-party) in having the target’s car be connected to a VC
system, allowing voice unlocking and/or pre-heating (which
often requires engine start). Thus, a compromised VC system
might be used by an attacker to gain access to the target’s car.
In this section we investigate the feasibility of such attacks,
using two major car manufactures, namely Tesla and Ford.
Tesla. Tesla cars allow their owner to interact with the car
using a dedicated Tesla-provided phone app. After installing
the app on our phone and linking it to a Tesla Model S vehicle,
we installed the “EV Car”§ integration, linking it to the vehi-
cle. While “EV Car” is not officially provided by Tesla, after
successful configuration using the vehicle’s owner credentials,
we were able to get several capabilities. These included getting
‡https://www.garadget.com/
§https://assistant.google.com/services/a/uid/000000196c7e079e?hl=en
information about the vehicle’s current location¶, locking and
unlocking the doors and trunk, starting and stopping the vehi-
cle’s charging and the climate control system. Next, we note
that we were able to perform all of these tasks using only voice
commands without the need of a PIN number or key proximity.
Finally, we were not able to start the car without key proximity.
Ford Cars. For newer vehicles, Ford provides a phone
app called “FordPass”, that connects to the car’s Ford SYNC
system, and allows the owner to interact with the car over the
Internet. Taking the next step, Ford also provides a FordPass
Google Assistant integration|| with similar capabilities as the
“EV Car” integration for Tesla. While Ford implemented PIN
protection for critical voice commands like remote engine start
and door unlocking, like in the case of August locks, there
is no protection against PIN brute forcing. Finally, while we
were able to remotely open the doors and start the engine,
shifting the vehicle out of “Park” immediately stopped the
engine, preventing the unlocked car from being driven.
6.4 Exploring Stealthy Attacks
The attacks described so far can be spotted by the user of
the targeted VC system in three ways. First, the user might
notice the light indicators on the target device following a
successful command injection. Next, the user might hear the
device acknowledging the injected command. Finally, the user
might notice the spot while the attacker tries to aim the laser at
the target microphone port.
While the first issue is a limitation of our attack (and in fact
of any command injection attack), in this section we explore
the attacker’s options for addressing the remaining two issues.
Acoustic Stealthiness. To tackle the issue of the device
owner hearing the targeted device acknowledging the execution
of voice command (or asking for a PIN number during the brute
forcing process), the attacker can start the attack by asking the
device to lower its speaker volume. For some devices (EcoBee,
Google Nest Camera IQ, and Fire TV), the volume can be
reduced to completely zero, while for other devices it can be set
to barely-audible levels. Moreover, the attacker can also abuse
device features to achieve the same goal. For Google Assistant,
enabling the “do not disturb mode” mutes reminders, broadcast
messages and other spoken notifications. For Amazon Echo
devices, enabling “whisper mode” significantly reduces the
volume of the device responses during the attack to almost
inaudible levels.
Optical Stealthiness. The attacker can also use an invisible
laser wavelength to avoid having the owner spot the laser light
aimed at the target device. However, as the laser spot is also
invisible to the attacker, a camera sensitive to the appropriate
wavelength is required for aiming. Experimentally verifying
this, we replicated the attack on Google Home device from
¶Admittedly, the audible location is of little use to a remote attacker who
is unable to listen in on the speaker’s output.
||https://assistant.google.com/services/a/uid/000000ac1d2afd15
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Section 5.1 using a 980-nm infrared laser (Lilly Electronics 30
mW laser module). We then connected the laser to a Thorlabs
LDC205C driver, limiting its power to 5 mW. Finally, as the
spot created by infrared lasers is invisible to humans, we aimed
the laser using a smartphone camera (as these typically do not
contain infrared filters).
Using this setup, we have successfully injected voice com-
mands to a Google Home at a distance of about 30 centimeters
in the same setup as Section 5.1. The spot created by the in-
frared laser was barely visible using the phone camera, and
completely invisible to the human eye. Finally, not wanting
to risk prolonged exposure to invisible (but eye damaging)
laser beams, we did not perform range experiments with this
setup. However, given the color insensitivity described in Sec-
tion 4.1, we conjecture that results similar to those obtained in
Section 5.2 could be obtained here as well.
6.5 Avoiding the Need for Precise Aiming
Another limitation of the attacks described so far is the need to
aim the laser spot precisely on the target’s microphone ports.
While we achieved such aiming in Section 6.1 by using geared
camera tripod heads, in this section we show how the need for
precise aiming can be avoided altogether.
An attacker can use a higher-power laser and trade its power
with a larger laser spot size, which makes aiming considerably
easier. Indeed, laser modules higher than 4W are commonly
available on common e-commerce sites for laser engraving.
Since we could not test such a high-power laser in an open-
air environment due to safety concerns, we decided to use
a laser-excited phosphor flashlight (Acebeam W30 with 500
lumens), which is technically a laser but sold as a flashlight
with beam-expanding optics (making it a class 3B system).
To allow for voice modulation, we modified the flashlight by
removing its original current driver and connecting its diode ter-
minals to the Thorlabs LDC240C laser driver (see Figure 11).
Then, the experimental setup of Section 5.2 is replicated except
that the laser diode and telephoto lens is replaced with the flash-
light. Using this setup, we successfully injected commands to
a Google Home device at a range of about 10 meters, while
running the flashlight at an output power of 1 W. Next, as can
be seen in Figure 11, the beam spot created by the flashlight
is large enough to cover the entire target (and its microphone
ports) without the need to use additional focusing optics and
aiming equipment. However, we note that while the large spot
size helps for imprecise aiming, the flashlight’s quickly diverg-
ing beam also limits the attack’s maximum range.
Finally, the large spot size created by the flashlight (cover-
ing the entire device surface) can also be used to inject the
sound into to multiple microphones simultaneously, thereby
potentially defeating software-based anomaly detection coun-
termeasures described in Section 7.
Figure 11: Setup with laser flashlight to avoid precise aiming.
(Left) Target device illuminated by the flashlight. (Right) Mod-
ified laser flashlight mounted on a geared tripod head aiming
at the target 10 meters away.
6.6 Reducing the Attack Costs
While the setups used for all the attacks described in this paper
are built using readily available components, some equipment
(such as the laser driver and diodes) are intended for lab use,
making assembly and testing somewhat difficult for a non-
experienced user. In this section we present a low-cost setup
that can be easily constructed using improvised means and
off-the-shelf consumer components.
Laser Diode and Optics. Modifying off-the-shelf laser
pointers can be an easy way to get a laser source with colli-
mation optics. In particular, cheap laser pointers often have no
current regulators, having their anodes and cathodes directly
connected to the batteries. Thus, we can easily connect a cur-
rent driver to the pointer’s battery connectors via alligator clips.
Figure 12 shows a cheap laser pointer based setup, available at
$18 for 3 pieces at Amazon.
Laser Driver. The laser current driver with analog modula-
tion port is the most specialized instrument of our setup, as we
used the scientific-grade laser drivers that cost about $1,500.
However, cheaper alternatives exist, such as the Wavelength
Electronics LD5CHA driver available for about $300.
Sound Source and Experimental Results. Finally, the at-
tacker needs a method for playing recorded audio commands.
We used an ordinary on-board laptop sound card (Dell XPS 15
9570), amplified using a Neoteck NTK059 Headphone Ampli-
fier ($30 on Amazon). See Figure 12 for a picture of a complete
low-cost setup. We have experimentally verified successful
command injection using this setup into a Google Home lo-
cated at a distance of 15 meters, with the main range limitation
being the laser focusing optics and an artificially-limited power
budget of 5 mW for safety reasons. Finally, we achieved a range
of 110 meters with the cheap setup by replacing the laser optics
with the telephoto lens from the previous sections.
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Figure 12: Setup for low-cost attack: a laser current driver
connected to a laser pointer attacking a Google Home device.
6.7 Attacking Non-MEMS Microphones
Although smart speakers, phones, and tablets typically use
MEMS microphones due to their small footprint, we also in-
vestigate the feasibility of the attack on larger, conventional
non-MEMS microphones. We empirically verify this using a
Sanwa 400-MC010 Electret Condenser Microphone, aiming
the (blue) laser beam through the microphone’s metallic mesh
(See Figure 13 (Left)). Using the same parameters as in Sec-
tion 4.2 (e.g., IDC = 200 mA and Ipp = 150 mA), we play a
chirp signal varying frequency linearly from 0 to 10 kHz in
5 seconds. Figure 13 (Right) shows the spectrogram of the
audio recorded by the microphone, clearly showing repeated
diagonal lines that correspond to the linear frequency sweep.
We thus conclude that our results are also applicable beyond
MEMS microphones, to electret condenser microphones.
7 Countermeasures and Limitations
7.1 Software-Based Approach
As discussed in Section 6.2, an additional layer of authen-
tication can be effective at somewhat mitigating the attack.
Alternatively, in case the attacker cannot eavesdrop on the de-
vice’s response (for example since the device is located far
away behind a closed window), having the VC system ask the
user a simple randomized question before command execution
can be an effective way to prevent the attacker from obtaining
successful command execution. However, note that adding an
additional layer of interaction often comes at a cost of usability,
Figure 13: (Left) Aiming a laser beam on an electret condenser
microphone. (Right) Spectrogram of the microphone’s output
showing a clearly visible chirp signal.
limiting user adoption.
Next, manufacturers can attempt to use sensor fusion tech-
niques [38] in the hopes of detecting light-based command
injection. More specifically, voice assistants often have multi-
ple microphones, which should receive similar signals due to
the omnidirectional nature of sound propagation. Meanwhile,
when the attacker uses a single laser, only one microphone
receives a signal while the others receive nothing. Thus, man-
ufacturers can attempt to mitigate the attack presented in this
paper by comparing signals from multiple microphones, ignor-
ing injected commands using a single laser. However, attackers
can attempt to defeat such comparison countermeasures by
simultaneously injecting light to all the device’s microphones
using multiple lasers or wide beams, see Section 6.5. We leave
this task of implementing such defenses and investigating their
security properties to future work.
Finally, LightCommands are very different compared to nor-
mal audible commands. For sensor-rich devices like phones
and tablets, sensor-based intrusion detection techniques [39]
can potentially be used to identity and subsequently block such
irregular command injection. We leave further exploration of
this direction to future work.
7.2 Hardware-Based Approach
It is possible to reduce the amount of light reaching the mi-
crophone’s diaphragm using a barrier or diffracting film that
physically blocks straight light beams, while allowing sound
waves to detour around it. Performing a literature review on
proposed microphone designs, we have found several such
suggestions, mainly aimed to protect microphones from sud-
den pressure spikes. For example, the designs in Figure 14
have a silicon plate or movable shutter, both of which elimi-
nate the line of sight to the diaphragm [40]. It is important to
note however, that such barriers should be opaque to all light
wavelengths (including infrared and ultraviolet), preventing
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Figure 14: Designs of MEMS microphone with light-blocking
barriers [40]
the attacker from going through the barrier using a different
colored light. Finally, a light-blocking barrier can be also im-
plemented at the device level, by placing a non-transparent
cover on top of the microphone hole, which attenuates the
amount of light hitting the microphone.
7.3 Limitations
Hardware Limitations. Being a light-based attack,
LightCommands inherits all the limitations of light-related
physics. In particular, LightCommands assumes a line-of-sight
threat model and does not properly penetrate opaque obsta-
cles which might be penetrable to sound. Thus, even if attack-
ing fabric-covered devices is sometimes possible (Section 5.2,
Google Home Mini), we believe that for fabric-covered micro-
phones’ ports, the thickness of the cover can prevent successful
attacks (e.g., in the case of Apple Homepods). We leave the
analysis of such scenarios to future work.
In addition, unlike sound, LightCommands requires careful
aiming and line of sight access. In our experiments, we show
how to partially overcome this limitation by using a telescope
to remotely determine the assistant type and location of the
microphones from the device’s appearance.
Finally, while line of sight access is often available for smart
speakers visible through windows, the situation is different for
mobile devices such as smart watches, phones and tablets. This
is since unlike static smart speakers, these devices are often mo-
bile, requiring an attacker to quickly aim and inject commands.
When combined with the precise aiming and higher laser power
required to attack such devices, successful LightCommands
attacks might be particularly challenging. We thus leave the
task of systematically exploring such devices to future work.
Liveness Test and Continuous Authentication. Unlike
some other injection attacks, LightCommands’ threat model
and lack of proper feedback channels make it difficult for the at-
tacker to pass any sorts of liveness checks or continuous authen-
tication methods. These can be as primitive as asking a user
simple questions before performing a command, or as sophis-
ticated as using data from different microphones [41, 42, 43],
sound reflections [44], or other sensors [45] to verify that the
incoming commands were indeed spoken by a live human. We
leave the task of implementing such defenses in deployed VC
systems as an avenue for future works.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we presented LightCommands, which is an at-
tack that uses light to inject commands into voice-controllable
systems from large distances. To mount the attack, we trans-
mit light modulated with an audio signal, which is con-
verted back to audio within the microphone. We demon-
strated LightCommands on many commercially-available
voice-controllable systems that use Siri, Portal, Google As-
sistant, and Alexa, obtaining successful command injections
at a distance of more than 100 meters while penetrating clear
glass windows. Next, we highlight deficiencies in the secu-
rity of voice-controllable systems, which leads to additional
compromises of third-party hardware such as locks and cars.
Better understanding of the physics behind the attack will
benefit both new attacks and countermeasures. In particular,
we can possibly use the same principle to mount other acoustic
injection attacks (e.g., on motion sensors) using light. In addi-
tion, heating by laser can also be an effective way of injecting
false signals to sensors.
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